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CORRESPONDENCE

JUDGE POSNER'S JURISPRUDENCE
OF SKEPTICISM
Steven J. Burton*
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism 1 is perhaps the most interesting
philosophical account of the nature of law and the judicial process
written by a sitting judge in many years. As a leading professor before
assuming the bench, Richard A. Posner had developed a rich economic theory of law. 2 The coherence of Professor Posner's socialscientific web of beliefs, 3 however, seems to have been challenged by
recalcitrant experiences in the actual judging of cases. In particular,
Judge Posner needs, but does not find, guidance in the law. The resulting frustration leads to a sweeping philosophical skepticism about
law, coupled uncomfortably with assurances that judicial practices are
stable and deserve respect.
This essay suggests that there is an instructive incompleteness in
Judge Posner's transition from scientific observer to legal actor. His
legal skepticism should be understood as a legacy of his days as an
inquiring economist, observing and forming beliefs about law and the
judicial process from the academy. His affirmation of judicial practices stems from his new respect for practical reason,4 which seems to
result from the experience of performing judicial duties. This essay

* Professor of Law and University Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa. - Ed. For their
helpful comments on and criticisms of the manuscript, I thank William G. Buss, Dan Farber,
Ken Kress, Edward H. Levi, Richard A. Posner, John Reitz, Serena Stier, and participants in the
Duke Law School's Faculty Colloquium held on September 9, 1988. The responsibility for any
error remains the author's.
1. Posner, The Jurisprudence ofSkepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). Subsequent references will be bracketed in the text.
2. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
3. The metaphor of a web of beliefs is spun out in BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND LEGAL REASONING 132-43 (1985), and in W. QUINE & J. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF
(1970).
4. On law as practical reason in the recent literature, see, e.g., J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975); Burton, Law
as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. (1989) (forthcoming); Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 24-36 (1986); Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward a11 Adequate Theory. 51 u. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985).
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will argue that a more complete assimilation of the practical perspective of the legal actor would undercut Judge Posner's arguments for
legal skepticism. 5

I.

JUDGE POSNER'S

Two PERSPECTIVES

Judge Posner's essay relies on two very different perspectives.
From a scientific perspective, he seriously doubts that law exists, that
the law guides judges, and that legal reasoning is a cogent activity.
From the practical perspective, by contrast, he affirms that most judicial decisions are reasonable. As will be seen, distinguishing between
these two points of view is an important first step toward a sound nonskeptical understanding of the law.
The starting point for Judge Posner's jurisprudence is in the philosophy of science. He opens the essay by defining two methods of
"exact inquiry" that are employed by the sciences as ways of acquiring
beliefs (p. 830). One method of exact inquiry is logical deduction. It
is used in law, according to Judge Posner, to answer easy questions.
But it is of little interest because such questions are not often litigated
(p. 832). The other method is empirical observation. It involves systematic empirical inquiry through experimentation leading to verification or, at least, falsification (p. 836). Posner laments that neither
scientific method plays a significant role in legal reasoning. Therefore,
~'[l]egal reasoning is not a branch of exact inquiry ... although continued progress in the economic analysis of law may compel a modification of this conclusion eventually" (pp. 858-59).
Two kinds of legal skepticism flow from this conclusion. First,
Posner advances a familiar epistemic skepticism: many legal questions
are indeterminate by the methods of legal reasoning (p. 853). Answers
to these questions turn on the "policy judgments, political preferences,
and ethical values of the judges" (p. 828). Second, and more disturbing, Posner advances a perhaps misnamed "ontological skepticism": the law does not exist because it is not an observable entity (pp.
828-29, 879-82, 891). The law is not a thing or set of concepts that
guides judges or anyone else (pp. 881, 882). Law, therefore, is "simply
the activity of judges" (p. 891). Attempts to discern predictable regularities in judicial behavior, like the behavior of rats or comets, is
about all that there is to talk about (pp. 879-83).
These two skepticisms depend directly on Posner's conception of
S. Other recent responses to legal skepticism include S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 188-93; R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 76-85 (1986); Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas'': Logical Positivist
Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Calif.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1989); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
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exact inquiry, which is an orthodox positivist conception of the scientific ideal (pp. 830~37, 879-82). That ideal prizes the values, among
others, of objectivity and determinacy in the formation of beliefs about
the world. Objectivity requires scientific inquiry to restrict its concerns
to objects of inquiry that have the capacity to lead all reasonable
human observers to the same conclusions about those objects (pp. 832,
834, 856, 857, 866). Judge Posner's ontological legal skepticism is a
special case of his general doubt about the existence of entities that
cannot be exactly observed (pp. 829, 866-71, 880-82, 891). The law
indeed lacks the sensible existence needed to lead all observers regularly to the same conclusions about it. 6 Determinacy requires a successful scientific inquiry to produce results that can be replicated and
that are not consistent with incompatible explanatory theories. 7 Posner's epistemic skepticism follows mainly from the unavailability of
experiments validating the truth oflegal claims (pp. 858-61). The law,
of course, cannot be reduced (without remainder) to empirically ascertainable facts (pp. 858-61). 8
Posner accordingly believes that "the methods of exact inquiry are
rarely usable by judges deciding cases" (p. 840). Rather, judicial reasoning is mainly a branch of practical reason (p. 859). Posner defines
practical reason as "the methods that people who are not credulous who have inquiring minds - use to form beliefs about matters that
cannot be verified by logic or exact observation" (p. 838). In his view,
"it includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition, ... empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, induction, . . . [and]
'experience'" (p. 838). Judges resort to this grab-bag of methods
when, as is often the case, the more reliable methods of exact inquiry
a,re not adequate. Posner assures us that "[p]ractical reason can answer most of the legal questions that logic cannot answer" (p. 840).
Rejecting a scientific approach to judging is not surprising for a
sitting judge, whose point of view is not that of an observer. In this
6. This does not mean that members of a community do not regularly come to the same
conclusions about how the law applies. Many observers have noted the amazingly high levels of
agreement among lawyers, judges, and others about what the law permits or requires in the
situations in which it claims to govern. E.g., sources cited in S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 96.
Posner agrees. He defends his two skepticisms, however, by confining his attention to cases that
come before courts because members of the legal community "are not much interested" in questions that are not litigated. Posner's sweeping skepticisms about law, however, are highly implausible if one takes into account all applications of law, which might include each decision by a
motorist to stop at a red light. That lawyers are not much interested in situations where the law
works unproblematically is not a good reason to dismiss such situations when claiming that the
law does not exist and cannot be known.
7. Judge Posner appeals to the value of determinacy at 832, 853, 859, 863, 891.
8. Burton, supra note 5, at 1147-52.
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case, however, it is very surprising in light of this judge's famous academic history. Posner's endorsement of practical reason, understood
to encompass both the point of view of an actor and ways of reasoning
that differ from those of the sciences, is a new development in his
thinking. He thus acknowledges his formerly strict logical positivism
and, at the same time, abandons it (pp. 839, 866, 888-89, 890). He
assures us that there are good answers to many ethical and legal questions independent of the verifiability of those answers by scientific
means (pp. 839-40, 874, 889). And he claims that, by contrast with
the methods of exact inquiry, including economic analysis, practical
reason comprises "our principal set of tools for answering questions
large and small" (pp. 838-39). These are important revisions to a formerly scientific web of beliefs about law.
As will be seen, however, shifting to the practical point of view has
implications beyond those outlined in The Jurisprudence of Skepticism. Posner's skepticisms, like those expressed in some Critical Legal
Studies, 9• depend on the scientific criteria of objectivity and determinacy. The undefended premise is that these orthodox scientific standards are among the necessary criteria for the existence and
identification of the law. Posner's arguments for legal skepticism fail if
scientific criteria do not govern law and judicial practice at all.

II.

SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL DISCOURSES

Different intellectual discourses, or "fanguage games," define conceptually different worlds of inquiry (with points of crossover in practice). Each discourse proceeds on its own assumptions, in its own
language, guided by its own rules, and under its own standards of success. Scientific and practical discourses are distinct in these ways.
Law is not a science to be understood or criticized in scientific terms.
Rather, law is a practical project to be understood and criticized in
practical terms from the outset of the ~nquiry. Therefore, scientific
criteria like Posner's do not govern law and judicial practice.
Consider, for example, the familiar distinction between "analytic"
discourses, like mathematics, and "synthetic" discourses, like the empirical sciences. Ordinary mathematics proceeds in terms of number,
equality, proof, transitivity, infinity, recursion, and the like, reflecting
9. Posner recognizes this similarity but is intent on distinguishing his skepticism from that of
radical skeptics in the Critical Legal Studies movement. Posner, supra note I, at 827. His claims
that the law does not exist and cannot be known by the methods of exact inquiry, see infra notes
12-15 and accompanying text, and his denial of the cogency of legal reasoning, do seem to be as
sweepingly nihilistic as the strongest of skeptical claims in Critical Legal Studies. However, his
claim that practical reason yields reasonable decisions in a wide range of cases is decidedly to the
contrary.
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the entities, relationships, and modes of existence that are recognized
within the mathematical world. This discourse requires rigorous warrants for making inferences at every step, and a successful proof must
be replicable by any competent mathematician at any time or place.
Empirical sciences, by contrast, use a language of hypotheses, data,
measurement, probability, statistical significance, and the like, in part
reflecting their interest in a different set of entities, in different kinds of
relationships, and with different modes of existence. The rules of this
discourse require experimentation and are far more concerned with
excluding the prejudices of the inquirer. The conceptual difference between the two discourses explains why it obviously is a mistake, for
example, to criticize a mathematical claim for lacking empirical
support.
The difference between analytic and synthetic discourses (hereafter
called "scientific discourses") is taken for granted in a culture, like
ours, that has been heavily influenced by logical positivism and related
modernist developments. Despite his announced break with logical
positivism on other matters, the same distinction marks Posner's two
branches of exact inquiry, which he calls "logic" and "empirical inquiry," and which undergirds his legal skepticism. I.n philosophical
circles, however, logical positivism generally is ridiculed despite (or
because of) its continuing influence in the wider culture. It failed as a
philosophy of science. More important for present purposes, it failed
to confine all legitimate knowledge to the scientific. Yet that is just
what Posner tries to do when advancing his two skepticisms.
As the analytic and synthetic have their respective discourses, it is
now widely appreciated that practical matters - ethics, politics, and
law - have a different and appropriate discourse outside of the sciences altogether. Both kinds of scientific knowledge are produced
from the human capacity to form beliefs about how things are. Analytic statements, on the other hand, express beliefs about the logical or
mathematical worlds, in which mathematical or logical concepts have
regular relationships that are known by analysis or calculation. Synthetic statements express beliefs about the empirical world, in which
objects and events are supposed to obey scientific laws that can be
known and tested by observation and measurement. But we also have
a capacity to act intentionally on reasons for action and, within limits,
thereby to change the empirical world in which we live. This is the
capacity for practical reason. It is not directed to the formation of
beliefs about how things are. Rather, it concerns how things ought to
be.
The capacity for practical reason is the converse of that used in the
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sciences to form beliefs. For example, the human mind makes representations of the world, as when we say that "the cat is on the mat."
Sometimes we say, "it is the case that the cat is on the mat," thereby
expressing a belief. That descriptive representation is true if; indeed,
the cat is on the mat. The representation can be changed if the cat is
not on the mat. By contrast, we sometimes say, "it ought to be the case
that the cat is on the mat." That prescriptive representation can be
true whether or not the cat is on the mat.- If the cat is not on the mat,
we can act by getting a cat and putting it on the mat! Thus, we have
the capacities both to change our representations to bring them into
conformity with the empirical world and, within limits, to bring the
empirical world into conformity with our representations.
A practical discourse is prescriptive in that it concerns how our
world ought to be in respects that can affect the conduct of our lives.
It has a distinctive vocabulary that (not coincidentally) tracks the normative language of the law: rights, duties, permissions, prohibitions,
principles, responsibilities, and excuses are among the recognized concepts. Its rules require claims to knowledge to be supported not by
proof or experimentation, but by rational argument about what someone ought to do. Most important, valid claims to practical knowledge
must satisfy criteria that are appropriate to a discourse directed to action, not criteria imported from discourses directed to the passive formation of beliefs.
Among the distinctive criteria of practical knowledge are normativity, impartiality, and good judgment, not the counterpart scientific
criteria of objectivity, neutrality, and determinacy. 10 As used here,
10. Many major moral philosophies in their most salient respects can be understood to hold
themselves responsible to something like these criteria of practical knowledge. Aristotle's ethics,
for example, uphold norms that are implicit in the telos of human nature, urge impartiality
through the cultivation of the virtues, and seek practical wisdom as the manifestation of good
judgment. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927 (R. McKeon trans. 1941). Kant's very different ethics nonetheless respond similarly to the criteria of
normativity (the categorical imperative), impartiality (universalization), and good judgment
(right action). I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. Paton trans.
1958); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965). Bentham's
distinctive ethics require normativity as the greatest good, impartiality through the pleasure principle with everyone counting for one, and good judgment by way of consequentialist or meansends rationality. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970).
More recent analytical philosophy supplies a meta-ethical dimension that also is responsive to
the same criteria of practical knowledge. Among the main topi~ of much recent moral philosophy are "ought" statements, universalizability, and normative justification on the balance of reasons for action. See generally, PRACTICAL REASONING (J. Raz ed. 1978); R. HARE, THE
LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1953); J. RAz, supra note 4; G. VON WRIGlIT, PRACTICAL REASON
(1983). The analytical effort is compatible with Aristotelian, Kantian, and Benthamite ethics
because it is on a third dimension in a matrix where the criteria of practical knowledge are on one
dimension and the various substantive moral theories are on the second.
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normativity refers to the guidance of action by standards of conduct
that are claimed to prescribe what someone ought to do. 11 Impartiality refers to the exclusion of ad hominem considerations, such as advantage to self, friends, or groups with which one identifies, from an
assessment of reasons for action. Good judgment refers to action on
the balance of reasons as well as possible under the circumstances,
without certain knowledge of the rightness or goodness of what we do.
These criteria supplant both objectivity and subjectivity, neutrality
and bias, and determinacy and indeterminacy because they are inappropriate dichotomies within a practical discourse.
In practice, of. course, scientific and practical elements are combined in human endeavors. An empirical scientist takes action when
embarking on a project, executing a research plan, publicizing the results, or incorporating the results into applications. The practice of
science, as such, includes some of these actions as needed to pursue
true beliefs. Conversely, the ethical. or legal actor might form beliefs
when deciding what to do. Since no one ought to do something. that is
impossible, beliefs about what is possible in human action are relevant
in practical deliberations. A judge, moreover, may make findings of
fact, identify general propositions of positive law, gauge the social consequences of a decision, and at times predict what the judges of another court would do. Such beliefs, however, are formed as needed to
act properly in a case. Significantly, we can be warranted in forming
beliefs ancillary to action on weaker evidence (e.g., a preponderance)
than would be required when claiming scientific knowledge.
The conceptual distinction accordingly is maintained to distinguish the capacities for pursuing scientific and practical goals. Keeping an eye on the goal of a project helps to sort out relevant from
irrelevant considerations. For example, a scientist who forms a private theoretical belief that a nuclear explosion is possible should have
appropriate reasons for the ·belief, but just by forming the belief incurs
no important ethical obligations. The reasons for belief primarily will
involve facts within the domain of nuclear physics. The acts of expressing that belief, such as building a device and detonating it, surely do
attract serious ethical obligations. Such acts should be supported by
appropriate reasons for action, which will involve moral principles.
Moreover, a judge who invalidates the death penalty on constitutional
grounds by that act is not responsible for representing any part of the
empirical world correctly. Her reasons for action might, however, require beliefs aboJ.It the deterrent or discriminatory effects of capital
11. The claim, of course, need not be valid. Thus, iniquitous laws can be norms. See J. RAZ,
LAw.28-33, 153-59, 233-62 (1979); infra text accompanying notes 24-28.

THE AUTHORITY OF
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punishment that, in turn, depend on scientific criteria. The conceptual
distinction between practical and scientific endeav9rs, reflected in the
difference between prescriptive and descriptive uses of language, helps
to disentangle what-is-a-reason-for-what and thereby aids clear understanding and criticism.
For these reasons, it should not be doubted on scientific grounds,
as Posner urges when advancing his ontological skepticism, that the
law exists in a mode appropriate to its practical nature. Some beliefs
themselves are more secure than any proofs which might be offered by
philosophy or science in their defense. It seems only with reference to
reasons for action that we can understand that (at least some) motorists stop at red lights because the lights are legal reasons for stopping,
or that a judge enters a default judgment because the defendant's dilatoriness is a legal reason for doing so. The law exists ontologically
insofar as there are such legal reasons for action, which are the primary entities recognized by a legal discourse. Posner's essay does not
even consider the law as a provider of reasons for action. His starting
point in the philosophy of science excludes such entities at the outset
of his inquiry, guaranteeing a skeptical conclusion before the relevant
arguments are even examined.
Similarly, it should not be doubted on scientific grounds, as Posner
does when advancing his epistemic skepticism, that we can have practical knowledge of the law. Scientists have the luxury of suspending
belief- for decades or centuries - if the available evidence is inadequate to warrant true beliefs. They often do so pending further inquiry. The criteria of scientific knowledge consequently can be
rigorous and even impractical. Legal actors, by contrast, typically
have no option to avoid action; they must act on the best available
alternative. The best course of action then must be judged on the balance of reasons under the circu;mstances,.whjch typically include limited time and resources for deliberation. 'J;'he law would be selfdefeating if it were not possible to act lawfully on a practical basis.
One should no more want to mix up practical and scientific discourses in legal theory. than to order a person forthwith to obey the
law of gravity. As I have shown at length elsewhere,1 2 law is a practical matter. It is a form of social organization through the systematic
institution of supreme authoritative standards of conduct. The law
represents a possible organization of social. relations and a commitment to bring it into empirical being by lawful action. Each application of the law brings the empirical world - notably, human behavior
12. Burton, supra note 4.
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-into conformity with the law in some respect. Jurisprudential questions about the existence and identification of the law are questions
about its practical role as a guide to conduct by judges and other
persons.
Posner thus glimpses something valuable when he emphasizes the
importance of social vision and imagination to a judge who must act
(pp. 829, 849-57, 863). The social vision he endorses, however, is that
of an individual judge, to be acted on when the methods of the exact
sciences run out, subject to minor constraints. The relevant social vision is represented by the legal standards and precedents which constitute the law that judges have a duty to uphold. 13 The traffic laws, for
example, represent a complex set of coordinated actions to be taken by
motorists in response to various colored lights and signs with various
shapes. To a remarkably large extent, motorists take those actions and
thus actualize that part of the normative organization of society represented by the traffic laws. Other laws, like those prohibiting the sale or
use of cocaine, represent a part of the normative organization of society but are notoriously ineffective, as evidenced by the common sale
and use of cocaine. The empirical world is brought into conformity
with such laws, if at all, when legal sanctions are imposed on violators.
Posner's jurisprudence of skepticism, by seeking scientific answers
to practical questions, renders invisible the social vision represented by
the law. Judges consequently would be freed to act on their own social
visions. For example, in Posner's hands, the doctrine of precedent becomes merely a way of acquiring information when judges deliberate
in a case (pp. 843-48). He defines precedents simply as "things that go
before," (p. 845), recognizing only the fact and chronology of judicial
decisions and excluding their normative significance. He thinks it only
reasonable for anyone choosing a course of action to consult past experience, and judges are no different from anyone else in this respect.
The "anecdotes" that are legal precedents, however, are of no greater·
significance for a judge's decision than the track record of a brand of
automobile is for a potential buyer's selection (pp. 844-47).
Judge Posner in effect denies that precedents are presumed to have
been decided correctly, that consistency or equal treatment requires
like cases to be decided alike, and that precedents are in any important
sense binding on judges. But he never argues against the conventional
view that a legal precedent is an authoritative legal reason for a similar
13. See S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 101-22. Posner sees statutory interpretation in a similar
way, but otherwise seems generally to disconnect the judge from any duty to apply the law by
denying that there is any such thing. See also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 198-222 (1985).
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case to be decided in the same way - that a relevant precedent is
binding in just the sense that it supplies (prima facie) 14 a mandatory
reason for action by judges. Again, this practical understanding seems
to have been excluded at the outset of Posner's inquiry when it should
at least have been a target of his argument.
The mistake of taking up a scientific discourse is further revealed
by the main virtue Posner claims for his unusual understanding of precedent and his legal realism.
Consistent with my view that precedent is more significant as information than as authority, I predict that a careful study would show that
judges who know more about a particular field of law are less deferential
toward precedent than equally able (and· no more "restrained") judges
who know less about the same field .... Th[is] hypothes[is] illustrate[s] a
distinctive aspect of the approach to jurisprudence set forth in this article: that it has explanatory and predictive potential. [p. 846]

The "significance" of precedent is ambiguous as between the scientific
and the practical. Whether judges in fact treat precedent variably is
distinct from whether they are legally required to follow it. The former question concerns part of the empirical significance of precedent
while the latter concerns its practical significance. The study that Posner proposes to verify his theory of precedent, of course, would be an
empirical study. He cannot successfully contest the practical understanding of precedent with that bare empirical claim, no matter how
many empirical studies support it, any more than proof that cocaine is
sold in New York shows that selling cocaine is lawful there.
The "distinctive aspect" of Posner's approach to jurisprudence is
its claim to social scientific falsifiability. It is as though he supposes
that the law exists, if at all, in a way that can be found, discovered, or
observed, and therefore known scientifically or by rough approximation thereto. When it turns out that the law cannot be thus known,
Posner reaches specious conclusions when he should reconsider his
starting point. His scientific discourse - like that of many strands in
legal realism and related modernist discourses - at the outset excludes the possibility that the law is to be understood from the perspective of legal actors through a practical discourse. It is not at all
surprising for a judge to be frustrated in failing to find scientific an14. Posner does not see how judges can reason from a precedent at all "unless the outcome of
the new case can be deduced from the prior case and the prior case cannot be reexamined." P.
845. This treatment of overruling assumes that the mere logical possibility of interpretation or
overruling deprives the precedent of any binding force in a highest court. A precedent, however,
is binding ''prima facie" in that, all else being equal, one ought to follow it in similar cases.
Overruling itself is an act that requires justification. The presence of such justification is sufficiently unusual in American practice that overruling requires exceptional reasons to override
stare decisis.
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swers to practical questions; it is surprising for a judge to look for such
answers in the first place.

III.

PRACTICAL REASON IN CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE

H.L.A. Hart's 1953 inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University 15 introduced the methods of analytic philosophy into jurisprudence. He thereby enhanced greatly the
philosophical quality of the venture. Hart sought to elucidate the legal
concepts embedded in our culture by analyzing how the members of a
legal community use language. He highlighted a most salient feature
of legal discourse - that it employs a vocabulary of rights, obligations, justifications, and excuses. Holmes, like Posner, had ignored
this normative language of the law, seeking to "substitut[e] a scientific
foundation for empty words." 16 Hart thought that these uses of language revealed a crucial feature of our concept of law - its role as a
provider of reasons for action.
Consider Hart's famous treatment of legal obligation 17 in light of
the distinction between scientific and practical discourses. He set up
the gunman situation in which A orders B to hand over B's money,
and threatens to shoot him if he does not comply. According to a
coercive model of law, Hart suggested, legal obligation is to be found
in the gunman situation writ large. Hart objected that we would misdescribe that situation in saying that B had an obligation; rather, we
would say thatB was obliged to hand over his money. The latter, Hart
continued, "is often a statement about the beliefs and motives with
which an action is done. . . . But the statement that someone had an
obligation to do something is of a very different type." 18 Statements of
obligation, Hart suggested, presuppose the existence of social rules
that provide standards of conduct, deviations from which are met with
insistent and strong social criticism as such. The normative vocabulary of the law, especially "right" and "duty," is used to draw attention to the rules, which are regarded by those who accept them as
reasons for conforming their conduct and justifications for criticism of
deviations by others. 19 Hart thus treated law with attention to the
15. H.L.A. HART, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983).
16. o.w. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 229
(1920).
17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961).
18. Id. at 80-81 (emphasis in original).
19. On social rules, see id. at 54-60.
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practical point of view, from which legal rules guide conduct. Legal
rules do not, by his account, predict, describe, or explain anything.
Hart's successors, despite large and deep differences on many
points, agree that the law is to be understood within a practical discourse. In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin recognizes the importance
of both the internal point of view of the participant i~ a legal practice
and the external point of view of a sociologist or historian. 20 Both
perspectives in his view are essential and must embrace or take account of the other:
The participant's point of view envelops the historian's when some claim
oflaw depends on a matter of.historical fact: when the question whether
segregation is illegal, for example, turns on the motives either of the
statesmen who wrote the Constitution or of those who segregated the
schools. . . . The historian's perspective includes the participant's more
pervasively, because the historian cannot understand law as an argumentative social practice, even enough to reject it as deceptive ... until he
has his own sense of what counts as a good or bad argument within that
practice. . . . This book takes up the internal, participants' point of
view. 21

John Finnis similarly insists that the law is an object of inquiry that is
constituted by human actions, practices, habits, dispositions, and discourse. It can be fully understood in his view only by understanding
their point as conceived by participants.22 For Finnis, moreover, a
philosophy of law requires the philosopher to take up the point of view
of practical reasonableness to construct good law. 23
Joseph Raz has done more than anyone else to work out the analytical implications of law as practical reason. 24 Indeed, he believes
that a "legal system can be conceived of as a system of reasons for
action." 25 Raz insists that many of his statements qua theorist, like
many statements of the law by teachers and practitioners, are "detached normative statements," or statements from the legal point of
view. 26 Such statements can be understood as we understand the
Christian who says to his Orthodox Jewish friend, who is about to eat
some pork fried rice unwittingly: "You ought not to eat that." This is
20. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 11-14 (1986).
21. Id. at 14.
22. J. FINNIS, supra note 4, at 3.
23. Id. at 3-18.
24. See generally J. RAZ, supra note 4; J. RAz, supra note 11; J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A
LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980); Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 THE MONIST 295 (1985).
25. J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM supra note 24, at 212.
26. J. RAZ, supra note 4, at 175-77; J. RAz, supra note 11, at 155-57; see also H.L.A. HART,
EssAYS ON BENTHAM 153-55 (1982) (discussing Raz's idea). Nonpositivists also recognize the
importance of such legal statements. E.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 4, at 234-37; Nonet, In the
Matter of Green v. Recht, 75 CAUF. L. REV. 363, 374 (1987).
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a fully normative statement in that it guides conduct. The Christian,
however, speaks from the point of view of one who accepts the laws of
Kosher without thereby endorsing those laws as right or good. Similarly, we can say that the law in South Africa requires blacks to use
separate public facilities without thereby approving of any part of
apartheid. The detached normative statement permits a legal theorist,
teacher, or practitioner to say "what the law is" and treat the law as a
practical matter without thereby endorsing it as right or good.
Judge Posner's ontological and epistemic skeptical claims are addressed to the same philosophical issues that are treated in the standard literature - in particular, that concerning the existence of legal
systems27 and the identification of the law. 28 A serious philosophical
argument in defense of legal skepticism must address the arguments in
that corpus of excellent work. However, that scholarly tradition is
wholly neglected in The Jurisprudence of Skepticism. Posner consequently misses the ways in which law as practical reason contests his
legal skepticism. ·
Judge Posner's new venture into the philosophy of law makes
grand claims with profound implications for the law. A less charitable
reading than mine might see skepticism about the existence and identification of the law, together with advocacy that a judge act on his own
27. The relevant literature, which must be contested to sustain an ontological claim like Posner's, concerns the conditions of existence for legal systems. Raz explains the philosophical
problem as follows:
What are the criteria for the existence of a legal system? We distinguish between existing
legal systems and those which have either ceased to exist (e.g., the Roman legal system) or
never have existed at all (e.g., Plato's proposed law for an ideal state). Furthermore, we say
that the French legal system exists in France but not in Belgium, and that in Palestine there
is now a different legal system from the one which was in force 30 years ago. One of the
objects of the theory of legal system is to furnish criteria to determine the truth or falsity of
such statements.
J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at l; see R. DWORKIN, supra note
20, at 101-04; H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 107-14, 247-48; H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at
155-62; J. RAz, supra note 4, at 125-29; J. RAz, supra note 11, at 28-33; P. SOPER, A THEORY OF
LAW 21, 55-56 (1984). On the existence of norms as such, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 17,
at 54-60; J. RAz, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, at 60-69.
28. The relevant literature, which must be contested to sustain epistemic skepticism about
the law, concerns the identity conditions for propositions of law. As Jules Coleman points out,
the problem of identity involves both an epistemic and a semantic dimension. Coleman, Negative
and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140-41 (1982). In its epistemic dimension, the
problem involves the standard which can be used to identify, validate, or discover a community's
law. Proposed solutions to the problem include the ideas of a rule of recognition, the commands
of a sovereign, showing legal practice in its best light as law, and the like. See, e.g., J, AUSTIN,
THE PROVINCE OF JpRISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI·
OUSLY 14-130, 291-368 (1978); R. DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 176-275; H.L.A. HART, supra
note 17, at 97-107; H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 127-61; J. RAZ, supra note 11, at 37-102, 14662; J. RAz, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 26, passim; Lyons, Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977); Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, supra note
24, at 295; Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75
MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977).
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social vision, as a strategic political move to do away with the traditional "fetters that bind judges"29 in a fell swoop, clearing the decks
for a new law based on principles of wealth maximization (p. 863). On
this reading, Judge Posner's assurances amount to a request to trust
him with the awesome power that our system provides to judges. Suspicion would be discouraged if Posner's arguments satisfied the highest intellectual standards. Among these is the obligation to master the
existing literature within the relevant field, exposing one's views to refutation and qualification, and responding with reasons to the arguments with which one differs. Judge Posner's essay, hoytever, invites
suspicion as well as criticism.
CONCLUSION

Judge Posner's legal skepticism results from his mistaken starting
point in the philosophy of science and his neglect of the main body of
relevant philosophical literature. As that literature suggests, a scientific discourse is inappropriate for understanding the nature of law and
the judicial process. The law is not a science in that it does not describe or predict social or official behavior. Rather, the law prescribes
conduct in order to bring into existence a possible (and preferably desirable) social world. Accordingly, the nature of law and the judicial
process are to be understood from the practical point of view in the
terms of a practical discourse. Judge Posner's arguments for legal
skepticism consequently miss their mark.

29. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975).

